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The Impact of Statutory Audit and Corporate Reporting Directives on 
Compliance Costs, Risk-taking and Reporting Quality of the EU Banks 
 
Abstract 
The paper examines the effects of recently introduced Statutory Audit and Corporate 
Reporting Directives (SACORD) on compliance costs and risk taking of the EU banks. Using 
data of 80 EU banks and 71 non-EU banks for the period 2004 to 2013, we estimate the 
effects of SACORD regulation compliance costs, risk taking and quality of reporting. Our 
results show that the economic effects of SACORD on audit fees are approximately 19 to 33 
percent higher relative to the non-EU banks. We also find robust evidence of significant 
increase in in total compliance costs. The findings are consistent with those reported in the 
previous literature mainly for the US banks that regulation increases compliance costs.  
Further, we find that post SACORD, there is a significant increase in risk-taking and a 
decline in reporting quality. Findings suggest that the SACORD regulation does not appear to 
have the desired effects of constraining risk-taking by banks. 
Keywords: Statutory Audit and Reporting Directive,  Compliance cost, Bank risk taking, Reporting 
quality, the EU  
JEL Classification: G18, G21 
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1. Introduction 
The importance of regulation for ensuring an efficient financial system is extensively 
discussed in the extant literature (see e.g. Dermine, 2006; Asaftei and Kumbhakar, 2008; and 
Klomp and Haan, 2012). How efficiently the financial system allocates capital has a 
significant impact on the nation’s economic success (Levine, 2005). The recent financial 
crisis has clearly shown that banks play a central role in the financial system and have an 
unambiguous relation with systemic risk. Their effective regulation is therefore a key feature 
of a sound financial system.  
The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union issued the directive 
2006/43/EC (SAD) which aims to harmonise statutory audit requirements across the 
European Union (EU) member states. Further it also issued directive 2006/46/EC (CRD) 
which primarily deals with credible financial reporting processes. These two regulations 
(SACORD, hereafter) aim to improve internal controls of publicly traded corporations in the 
EU by increasing the disclosure quality
1
. Bushman and Williams (2015) argue that publicly 
disclosed financial reports are a key source of bank transparency and can help in reducing 
risk-taking and enhancing financial stability.
2
 Greater disclosure requirements in SACORD 
are aimed at reducing information asymmetry by improving the quality of information in the 
financial statements and enable stakeholders to adequately appraise the risk.
3
 
This paper empirically examines the impact of SACORD on the compliance costs, risk taking   
and quality of reported earnings of the EU banks. The following provisions in the SACORD 
motivate us to predict that the new regulation will have significant impact on audit costs, risk-
taking and reporting quality.  
                                                          
1
 Majority of the EU countries in our sample adopted the SACORD from 2008. However, following countries 
adopted the SACORD after 2008; Austria (2009), Czech Republic (2009), Germany (2009), Poland (2009), 
Sweden (2009), Ireland (2010), Italy (2010), Spain (2010). 
2 Barth and Schipper (2008; p.173) define financial reporting quality as “the extent to which financial reports 
reveal an entity’s underlying economics in a way that is readily understandable by those using the financial 
reports.” 
3
 See Leuz and Wysocki (2016) for a survey of the disclosure literature. 
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Article 26 of SAD and article 2 of CRD require adoption of the International Standards on 
Auditing (ISA) and the disclosure of off-balance sheet (OBS) arrangements and related party 
transactions (RPTs). Further, Article 1(7)(2) of CRD requires statutory auditors to verify that 
the board of directors have produced a corporate governance statement. Since the auditors are 
required to provide independent assurance of the credibility of financial statements, we 
expect them to charge higher audit fee to cover the costs of additional audit effort required to 
reduce risk of material misstatement and to counter litigation threats.  
We also examine the effects of SACORD on bank risk-taking. Like most businesses, banks 
too are value-maximizing entities but they need to balance this with protecting the public 
interest (Mehran and Mollineaux, 2012) and the economy (Acharya and Ryan, 2016). One 
strand of the banking literature posits that increased disclosure can deter banks from 
excessive risk-taking through outside discipline (e.g., Blum, 2002; Chen and Hasan, 2006; 
Nier and Baumann, 2006; Bushman and Williams, 2012). Akhigbe et al. (2016) find evidence 
which suggests a decline in risk taking by banks and financial institutions following the 
introduction of the Dodd–Frank regulation.  
On the other hand, extant research also reports a positive association between increase in 
regulation and increase in bank risk-taking. Evidence suggests that the illiquid and harder to 
observe nature of banks’ portfolios make it is difficult for the market to discipline risk-taking 
(Morgan, 2002; Flannery et al., 2013), spurring bank managers to take on excessive risks. 
Bouvard et al. (2015) and Moreno and Takalo (2016) in their theoretical model argue that 
despite the benefits of increased disclosures, the associated costs are a significant financial 
burden which can influence banks to take more risks.   
The evidence of the effects of regulation in the extant literature is mixed since while some 
studies find a positive impact while others report that disclosure regulations can increase 
managerial incentives to take more risks. The SACORD regulation will be implemented 
across the EU countries and a thorough investigation of its effects will offer rich insights to 
regulators and other stakeholders about the risk-taking behaviour of EU banks. Acharya and 
Ryan (2016) also suggest that more research on the impact of disclosure regulation on risk-
taking by banks will help in understanding the true effects of financial regulation. 
Finally, we examine whether SACORD regulation has improved the quality of financial 
reporting. This is important from a regulator’s perspective because one of the objectives of 
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disclosure regulation is to improve the quality of financial information (e.g., Bischof, 2009; 
Bushman, 2014). However, there is empirical evidence to the contrary which suggests that 
increased information transparency can lead to a decline in reporting quality as banks attempt 
to avoid disclosure by changing assets composition and their classification in the financial 
reports (Hodder et al., 2002; Thakor, 2015 and Iselin and Nicoletti, 2016). Examination of 
EU banks’ reporting quality due to the SACORD regulation will be highly valuable to the 
regulators in enhancing the robustness of the financial system in the EU. 
Examining the impact of SACORD regulation on EU banks is important for several reasons. 
First, the combined assets of EU banks represent about half of global banking assets with 
branches and subsidiaries around the world networks (Lehmann and Nyberg, 2014). Effective 
regulation of EU banks therefore has global implications. Second, it is informative to 
regulators to gain insights into the potential costs and benefits of compliance with SACORD 
to know whether the benefits are commensurate with costs (e.g., LaFond and You, 2010).
 
Both Posner and Weyl (2013) and Cochrane (2014) suggest that cost-benefit analysis of 
regulation is necessary to understand the economic consequences of the regulation. Finally, to 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that offers empirical evidence of the impact 
of SACORD on the compliance costs, risk-taking and reporting quality of EU banks thus 
contributing to the extant literature which dominated with research based mainly on the US 
market.   
We employ a difference-in-differences (DID) estimation approach commonly used for 
examining the effects of changes in regulation (e.g., Altamuro and Beatty, 2010; Kross and 
Suk, 2012; Petacchi, 2015). In doing so, we control for firm-level characteristics i.e., firm 
size, leverage, business diversity, profitability, firm growth opportunities and global 
importance which could influence costs, risk taking and reporting quality of banks. 
One of the challenges in using (DID) estimation is finding a control sample. We follow an 
approach similar to the one used by Bargeron et al. (2010) and Dambra et al. (2015) and 
include listed banks in the US and Canada as a control sample. Importantly, to mitigate the 
concern that changes in our sample composition might affect our results, we require our 
treatment and control sample to have at least one observation in the pre- and post-regulation 
period. 
Our results a robust evidence of significant increase in compliance costs of EU banks 
following the SACORD. We find that on average the compliance costs are higher by 17 to 39 
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percent post-SACORD for the EU banks relative to control sample of non-EU banks. In 
terms of the impact on the risk-taking, we find an increase in risk-taking by the EU banks 
following the introduction of SACORD. Consistent with Moreno and Takalo (2016), this may 
suggest that increase in transparency increases rollover risk and banks compensate this 
adverse effect by increasing their risk-taking.  Finally, we find a decline in the reporting 
quality post-SACORD which suggests that the increased disclosure requirements are counter-
productive as far as quality of financial reporting is concerned.    
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of relevant 
regulations in SACORD with regard to financial reporting, disclosures and risk taking and 
related literature. Section 3 explains data and methods used in the study. Section 4 presents 
and discusses empirical findings. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 SACORD and compliance costs 
The SACORD aims to improve auditing standards and increase transparency of off-balance 
sheet transactions. Banks perceive that these disclosure requirements will significantly 
increase compliance costs. HSBC’s recent consideration to relocate its headquarters from the 
UK is a case in point of the effects of soaring compliance costs.
4
  The following provisions of 
SACORD lead us to predict that the regulation will adversely affect the audit costs of the EU 
banks. 
2.1.1 Auditing standards, off-balance sheet disclosure and related parties’ transactions 
Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits (SAD) aims to harmonise the quality of audit in the 
EU, whereas Directive 2006/46/EC on corporate reporting (CRD) aims to promote credible 
financial reporting processes. The overall objectives of SAD and CRD are to improve 
corporate governance, transparency and disclosure of accounting information to promote 
reliable financial reporting, increase comparability and enhance public confidence in the audit 
function.  
With an aim to ensure consistently high audit quality within the EU, article 26 of SAD 
requires the adoption of the International Auditing Standards (IAS) also referred to as 
International Standards on Auditing (ISA). Also, article 2 of CRD requires disclosure of Off-
                                                          
4
 FT.com (2015). HSBC threatens to move headquarters from UK, April 24. 
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Balance Sheet (OBS) arrangements and Related Party Transactions (RPTs) to enhance 
confidence in the audit quality and the credibility of financial reports.
5
   
We argue that the adoption of the IAS will increase work required in auditing accounts as 
auditing firms would have to employ knowledgeable and experienced auditors. There has 
been a dramatic growth in the use of off-balance sheet (OBS) activities (e.g., standby letters 
of credit, guarantees, and special purpose entities (SPEs)) in the banking sector (Jagtiani et 
al., 1995; Mills and Newberry, 2005; Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2014). Banks do not 
disclose the OBS assets and liabilities in the financial statements. However post SACORD, 
banks will be required disclose these in the notes to the annual accounts.  
Previous research suggests that banks view RPTs as instruments they can use to facilitate 
personal gains, profit expropriation and fraudulent reporting (e.g., OECD, 2009; 2012; 
Ryngaert and Thomas, 2012). According to AICPA (2001), RPTs are difficult to audit as it is 
difficult to identify such transactions, Auditors have to rely on management to provide 
information on RPTs. Lo and Wong (2016) suggest that adequate disclosure of RPTs 
complements weak corporate governance and improves the value relevance of financial 
information.  
To the extent that the statutory auditors are now required to conduct their audit in accordance 
with IAS requirements, and carry out quality assurances on OBS and RPTs, we expect a 
significant increase in audit fees for banks operating in the EU.  
A large number of studies offer evidence of increased compliance costs due to the adoption 
of new regulations (see, for example, Leuz et al., 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009; Kamar 
et al., 2009; Battalio and Schultz, 2011; Gao et al., 2013; Hostak et al., 2013). Iliev (2010) 
investigates the effect of SOX on compliance costs in the United States and find that 
compliance with new regulation leads to a significant an increase in audit fees.  
We expect that SACORD legislation will significantly increase both the extent and quality of 
statutory audit work, auditors will charge higher fee to compensate for the additional work. 
This will lead to a significant increase in audit costs post-SACORD. Thus first hypothesis is: 
P1: The compliance costs for the EU banks would increase post-SACORD regulation. 
                                                          
5
 http://www.kapitalmarktrecht-im-
internet.eu/en/Areas%20of%20Law/Company_Law/European_Law/96/Directive_2006_46_EG.htm 
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2.2 SACORD and bank risk taking 
2.1.3 Audit committee provision 
To ensure the effectiveness of the internal control systems and promote credible financial 
reporting processes, Article 41(1) of SAD requires that the audit committee should consist of 
at least one independent director with financial expertise. Article 41(2b) requires public-
interest entities (PIEs)
 6
  to have an audit committee with a specific responsibility to monitor 
the effectiveness of internal control, internal audit, and risk management systems.
 
 Article 
41(4) requires the statutory auditor to report to the audit committee any material weaknesses 
in internal control systems. Further, Article 1(7) of CRD requires the board to include in the 
annual financial report, a corporate governance statement that outlines the internal control 
and risk management systems.  
The provisions as mentioned above, in addition to those outlined in Article 2 of CRD 
regarding OBS and RPTs will increase transparency and influence the risk-taking behaviour 
of EU banks. Extant literature has found a link between two. For instance, Sun and Liu 
(2014) examine the effect of audit committee on bank risk-taking and find a negative 
association between audit committee effectiveness and risk. Akhigbe et al. (2016) report 
reduction in risk-taking by US banks after the passage of Dodd–Frank regulation.  
There is, however, a body of research which argues that increase in regulation can be 
counter-productive. Goldstein and Sapra (2013) develop a theoretical model to illustrate how 
increased disclosure can lead to sub-optimal behaviour in banks and cause management to 
make inefficient investment decisions. Morrison and White (2013) show that increased 
disclosure can cause interbank contagion where the failure of one bank may weaken 
creditors’ confidence in regulator’s competence. Further, Moreno and Takalo (2016) argue 
that increasing transparency can increase depositors’ uncertainty about the solvency of banks, 
exacerbating panic and rollover risk that would eventually create incentives for banks to 
increase their risk-taking.
7
  
                                                          
6
 Article 2 of CRD defines public-interest entities (PIEs) as publicly listed companies, credit institutions, 
insurance entities and any other entities member states designate as public-interest entities that are of significant 
public relevance. 
7
 Matutes and Vives (2000) argue that full transparency and a risk based depositor insurance schemes lead to an 
equal risk-taking incentive. Hyytinen and Takalo (2002) argue that costs associated with increasing disclosure 
may offset or over compensate the benefits accruing from transparency. 
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These competing arguments create a demand for empirical analysis. While SACORD is 
expected to facilitate the reduction of bank risk-taking behaviour through increased 
disclosure, the opacity of banks’ risk assets exposures (Morgan, 2002), complexity of their 
financial structure and investment-risk choices (Boyd and Prescott, 1986; Bushman and 
Williams, 2015), the moral hazard created by the government backed financial safety nets 
(Dam and Koetter, 2012), the weak force of market discipline for excessive risk-taking (Dam 
and Koetter, 2012), and shareholders’ short-run interests to maximise their share value 
(DeYoung et al., 2013) can undermine its intended effects and induce banks to take more 
risk. Thus our second hypothesis is:  
P2: Risk-taking by EU banks will change post SACORD implementation. 
 
Conventional wisdom suggests that more disclosure will enable investors to more effectively 
prevent managerial rent extraction, strengthen market discipline, and increase transparency of 
sensitive financial information. Prior literature also suggests increased disclosure is 
associated with improved financial reporting quality (see, Bischof, 2009). Gebhardt and 
Novotny-Farkas (2011) report a reduction in income smoothing behaviour of European banks 
post-IFRS adoption. Further, Altamuro and Beatty (2010) find an association between the 
implementation of the mandated internal control provisions of the Federal Depository 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) and higher reporting quality.  
However, it is possible for the reporting quality to decline following introduction of new 
regulation. For instance, Vashishtha (2014) argue bank shareholders’ demand for improved 
disclosure may decline because they profit from the cost savings from the reduced 
information disclosure. Thakor (2015) develops a theoretical model and demonstrates that 
banks may choose to disclose less information because more disclosure may increase their 
fragility.  
Overall, given the focus of SACORD on reporting quality, we expect the adoption of 
SACORD will affect reporting quality. However, to the extent that shareholders may want to 
disclosure less information to protect the market value of the assets and revenue from 
competing lenders and management may desire to maximize their utility, the quality of 
reporting may decline (Laux, 2014).  Thus our final hypothesis is:  
 P3: Quality of financial reporting will change post SACORD implementation. 
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3. Sample Selection, Methods, and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Data and Sample Selection   
We use annual financial statement data from 2004 to 2013 for all listed banks in the EU, US 
and Canada collected from DataStream. We extract the missing information from the annual 
report of firms from Perfect Filing database. We use listed banks because audit fees and stock 
return data are only available for listed banks in Datastream. We choose 2004 as the start date 
because prior to 2004, audit fee data is available only for a small number of EU banks. We 
classify all observations from 2004 to the year before SACORD adoption as the pre-
SACORD and all observations from the year of implementation and enforcement to 2013 as 
post-SACORD.   
For a bank to be included in our sample, we require at least five years of data on key 
accounting variables. Further, we exclude those banks which commenced their operation 
after 2008 and/or banks for which audit fees is not available. Our final sample comprises 151 
listed banks, 80 banks (735 bank-years) from the EU and 71 banks (681 bank-years) from the 
US and Canada.    
Although one of the main objectives of the paper is to study the effect of SACORD on audit 
costs, we also include non-audit fees to examine the impact on total fees since previous 
research has shown a significant positive association between audit fees and non-audit fees 
(Palmrose, 1986b; Schmidt, 2012).  
 
3.2 Research Methods 
3.2.1  Difference-in-differences 
We use a DID analysis that is commonly used for examining the unique effects of regulatory 
changes (e.g., Daske et al., 2008; Low, 2009; Dambra et al., 2015; Petacchi, 2015). The DID 
estimation combines the difference and pre-post comparison evaluation methodology by 
estimating the change in outcome over time in the treatment and control samples and then 
taking the difference between these two samples. It assumes that both samples would have 
followed parallel paths over time if the treatment sample is not affected by a specific 
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intervention (Wooldridge, 2012). Thus, if the SACORD is the cause for increase in audit fees, 
this increase should be concentrated in EU Banks.   
The empirical challenge of implementing the DID research design is to identify a control 
sample that is not affected by the regulation (e.g., Hochberg et al., 2009; Leuz and Wysocki, 
2016). SACORD affects all EU firms and thus identifying a control sample not affected by 
SACORD regulation from the EU countries is not possible. There is a general agreement in 
the extant literature that developed economies like the US, UK and the EU are exposed to 
similar underlying economics (Gerakos et al., 2013) and financial regulation (Coates and 
Srinivasan, 2014). These countries also share similar institutional arrangements (La Porta et 
al., 2006), and have comparable market capital environments and regulations (Zhang, 2007; 
Bargeron et al., 2010).  For example, Bargeron et al. (2010), Lee et al. (2014) and Dambra et 
al. (2015) use firms from the UK, Canada, Germany and France as control sample for 
investigating the effects of SOX and Fair Disclosure and JOBS Act on US firms.  We follow 
a similar approach and use listed banks in the US and Canada as control since they are not 
affected by the SACORD regulation.  
3.2.2 The SACORD and the Audit costs  
For testing our first prediction, we estimate the following baseline DID model to examine 
whether the SACORD explains the cross-sectional time series variation in changes in the 
audit costs of EU banks: 
𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑈𝑅 ∗ 𝑃𝑠𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑁𝐼𝑅/𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑁𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽9𝐺𝑒𝑜_𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑅𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐵𝑖𝑧𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽13𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡_𝑔𝑟𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽17𝐿𝐿𝑃/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽18𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽19𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡        (1) 
In the model,  𝑎𝑡 is year fixed effects, θi is firm fixed effects, β1 is the coefficient of our 
primary variable of interest which is interaction between the indicator for EU Banks (EUR=1 
if EU Bank) and SACORD post-adoption period (PsSACORD=1 if post SACORD). If EU 
banks are subject to increase in audit fees post-SACORD, then the coefficient β1 that 
captures the differential changes in audit fees should be positive.  
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To capture the differences in the effect of SACORD adoption, we use the natural logarithm of 
audit fees (Auditfees) as a proxy for compliance costs (see Iliev, 2010; De George et al., 
2013) over the period 2004 to 2013 partitioned on pre-SACORD period (2004 to year prior 
adoption) and post-SACORD period (year of adoption to 2013). To account for any 
systematic difference in the compliance costs associated with the sample, we include 
additional company-specific characteristics in our model. We include the natural logarithm of 
sales (Revenue) as a control for firm size (Petacchi, 2015), we also include return on assets 
(ROA) and loss indicator (Loss_Ind), a dummy variable equal to one if a firm reports a loss 
for the year as a measure for profitability (De George et al., 2013, Lang and Stice-Lawrence, 
2015). The standard deviation of cash flows from operations (STDCFO) and long term debt 
scaled by total assets (LTDebt/TA) are measures of financial distress (Beaver et al., 2005; 
Chen et al., 2016a). Accrual (Accrual/TA) and number of foreign business operations 
(Geo_Seg) are control variables for audit complexity (De George et al., 2013). In addition, 
we measure business risks using net loans to total assets (Nloan/TA) and loan loss provision 
to total assets (LLP/TA) (Soedarmono et al., 2013), we include the number of audit 
committee members (AuditCommN) as control for board effective oversight (Badolato et al., 
2014). Tobin’s q (TobinQ) is a measure of firm performance (Badertscher et al., 2014) and 
annual total asset growth ratio (Asset_grwth) is a proxy for growth opportunities (Guedhami 
et al., 2014). We include non-interest income scaled by revenue (NIR/Rev) to control for 
income diversity. Following Ho et al. (2016), we control for financial crisis (FinCrs) which 
equals one during the period 2007 to 2009, other period are non-crisis period. We also control 
for the impact of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) with dummy equals 1 
from 2005 for countries that have implemented IFRS. 
To account for country specific effects, we include the natural logarithm of real GDP per 
capital (RperCapInc) and business extent of disclosure index (BizDisclos_Indx) obtained 
from World Development Indicator (WDI). We also include economic freedom index 
obtained from the Heritage Foundation (EconFreedm) to control for institutional factors that 
might affect the overall level of bank efficiency in a country.
8
  We do not control for audit 
firms as almost all EU banks in our sample were audited by the BIG 4. Ghosh and Tang 
(2015) note that not including some controls in audit fees model is not a concerning issue 
because the model with R-squares greater than 70 percent is generally well-specified and thus 
                                                          
8
 http://www.heritage.org/index/explore 
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help mitigate concerns of potential omitted variables bias that may affect audit costs 
estimation. All bank characteristics are as defined in Appendix A. 
The analysis of the DID model is robust to firm and year fixed effects that account for any 
time-invariant and cross-sectional heterogeneity in audit fees and also addresses potential 
endogeneity concerns (Petacchi, 2015). The estimated standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level and corrected for heteroskedasticity (Petersen 2009).  
To test the impact of SACORD on audit costs across the size (small, midsize and large) of 
banks, we distinguish banks by using the percentile value of total assets and introduce a size 
variable in our model that takes the value of one for small, midsize and large bank post-
SACORD and zero otherwise.  Banks with total assets in the lower quartile are classified as 
‘small banks’ and banks with total assets in the upper quartile are classified as ‘large banks’. 
All other banks with total assets between the lower and upper quartiles are classified as 
midsize banks for the treatment and control sample. This design holds year and firm effects 
constant and allows the study of the effect associated with regulatory change on compliance 
costs as bank size changes.  We interact each of these variables with PsSACORD to capture 
the changes in compliance costs in response to the passage of SACORD.  
 
3.2.3  The SACORD regulation and risk taking 
In line with our second hypothesis, we estimate the regression model as specified in equation 
(2). We include firm fixed effects to control for unobserved firm-specific trends in bank risk 
taking and the firm-year fixed effects to control for unobserved time varying post treatment 
trends at the firm level in risk taking. Specifically, the basic regression model defined as: 
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡  = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑈𝑅 ∗ 𝑃𝑠𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐷𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (2) 
where RISK in equation (2) is our proxy for measuring bank risk taking. We include deposits 
scaled by total assets (Deposit/TA) to control for market power (Marrouch and Turk-Ariss, 
2014) and cash flow from operations scaled by total assets (CFO/TA) as proxy for cash 
holding (Chen et al., 2016b). Further, we include an indicator variable equal to one if 
institutional shareholding (Inst_Investor) in a firm is more than five percent and zero 
otherwise to control for institutional holding influence on risk taking. Other controls remain 
the same as in equations (1) and (2) and all variables are as defined in Appendix A.  
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We construct three measures of risk taking. First, following Pathan (2009), we compute a Z-
score for each bank that is also a composite risk measure of bank stability and measures 
bank’s probability of insolvency.  
𝑍 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝐿𝑛 (
𝑅𝑂𝐴+𝐶𝐴𝑅
𝜎(𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑅)
)        (3) 
where ROA is the return on assets, CAR is the capital asset ratio and 𝜎(𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑅) is one year 
standard deviation of daily stock  returns for each bank. The Z-Score is constructed by adding 
the ROA to CAR and dividing by the standard deviation of stock returns. Since the Z-score is 
heavily skewed, we use its natural logarithm (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009; Houston et al., 
2010) to reduce its skewness and we multiply by (-1) to make a higher Z-score reflects a 
higher risk-taking.
9
 
Second, we use stock return volatility measured as the natural logarithm of the standard 
deviation of daily stock returns in a fiscal year to proxy for bank risk taking (Pathan, 2009). 
Higher volatility of stock returns would indicate higher risk taking and a lower value would 
suggest lower risk-taking.  
Third, we use bank’s credit rating as a proxy for risk taking. Following Iannotta et al. (2013), 
we use the average numerical value of Standard & Poor (S&P), Moody and Fitch credit 
ratings as a proxy for bank risk taking.
10
 The credit rating is an independent opinion of rating 
agency on a firm’s creditworthiness and incorporates forward-looking information about the 
effects of macroeconomic conditions on firm’s financial health. Lower credit ratings would 
indicate a bank with a less risky projects and higher credit ratings would suggest a bank 
taking on riskier projects. 
Further, we study the SACORD’s impact on small, medium and large firms by introducing a 
dummy variable in the model: 
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡  = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑈𝑅 ∗ 𝑃𝑠𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐷 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4) 
 
where Size is the size indicator variable (SmBK, MsBK, LgBK) that takes the value of one 
for small, midsize or large bank post-SACORD and zero otherwise. RISK and 
                                                          
9
 34 firm-year observations were less than zero, we left it as missing data.  
10
 See Iannotta et al. (2013) for the numerical coding of credit ratings 
15 
 
EUR*PsSACORD are as previously defined, and Χ is a vector of control variables previously 
defined in equation (2).   
4. Empirical results 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analyses. Panel A shows 
the descriptive statistics for all key variables of interest for treatment and control groups. The 
average (median) audit fees of €9.0 (€1.8) million for the EU banks (treatment) is 
significantly higher than €5.1 (€1.0) million for the benchmark banks (control) before 
logarithmic transformation. The mean (median) total fees in our treatment sample is €10.8 
(€2.3) million, and is significantly higher than €5.8 (€1.0) million for control sample 
respectively. Further, treatment sample mean (median) revenue of €13.8 (€3.1) billion, are 
significantly higher than €6.9 (€0.6) billion for control sample respectively, suggesting that 
our sample is somewhat skewed toward larger banks.  
The sample banks long-term debt to total assets (LTDebt/TA) mean (median) of 2.54 (2.73) 
percent is significantly higher relative to control sample of 1.69 (1.83) percent. On average, 
12 percent of treatment and control sample made losses (Loss_Ind) annually. Treatment 
(control) sample income diversity (NIR/Rev) is significantly higher with mean ratio of 31.07 
(23.77) percent, suggesting that treatment group generate more revenue from non-interest 
generating activities relative to control sample. 
Panel B of Table 1 shows summary statistics of treatment and control groups selected 
variables average for the pre- and post-SACORD periods. The mean audit fees for the 
treatment (control) sample increased from €8.0 million to €9.8 million (€4.2 million to €5.6 
million), respectively. While the average revenue is marginally lower at €13.7 billion from 
€14.0 billion. In contrast, the average revenue of the control sample increased from €6.5 
billion to €7.1 billion.   
The treatment and control group average profitability as measured by ROA declined between 
the pre- and post-SACORD sample periods. In addition, both treatment and control groups 
have a higher rate of reported losses (Loss_Ind), increased business risks (LLP/TA), and 
lower growth opportunities (TA_Growth) post SACORD. The decline in ROA and 
Asset_grwth, and increase in Loss_Ind and LLP/TA post SACORD can also be associated 
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with the 2008 financial crisis (Fahlenbrach et al., 2012). For example, Ivashina and 
Scharfstein (2010) show that banks’ lending declined during the financial crisis and Beltratti 
and Stulz (2012) show that the financial crisis of 2007-2009 affected the overall performance 
of banks.  In sum, the current financial crisis had a huge impact on banks’ profitability and 
performance. 
Panel C presents the Pearson correlations of key variables. Audit fee (Auditfees) is positively 
correlated (0.90) with firm size (Revenue) and (0.64) with audit complexity (Geo_Seg). This 
is consistent with the idea that firm size and audit complexity are determinants of audit fee.
11
 
We also find some variables are also correlated. To address concerns of multicollinearity in 
our regression analyses, we calculate the variance inflation factors (unreported) and find they 
are less than 10 for all regressions, indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue in any of 
our tests (Kennedy, 2008).   
[INSERT Table 1 (Panel A to C] 
 
4.2 Matched sample analysis 
To mitigate concerns that the difference-in-differences estimation parallel trends assumption 
is satisfied in the pre-treatment years spanning 2004-2007, we adapt Kausar et al. (2016) and 
match our sample variables by year before the regulatory adoption. Specifically, we 
considered firm size (Ln(Revenue)), financial performance (ROA), business risks 
(Nloan/TA), growth opportunities (Asset_grwth) and financial distress (LTDebt/TA, 
Ln(STDCFO)) documented in prior research to control for audit fees and risk-taking 
outcomes. We use nearest neighbor matching without replacement, using a caliper distance of 
0.01 to avoid bad matches. To analyse the differences in matching covariate balance between 
EU and non-EU banks, we follow Focke et al. (2016) and compute the normalized 
differences in the pre-SACORD periods. Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) suggest computed 
normalized differences should not exceed 0.25 to remove specification sensitivity in the 
regression model.  
Panel A (B) of Table 2 presents the mean values of the matching variables for our treatment 
and control sample pre (post) regulation. The table indicates that our matching procedure 
                                                          
11
 See Hay et al. (2006) for a survey of the literature on the determinants of audit fees 
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results in no statistical difference at the 0.01 level between the two groups with respect to the 
matched variables in the pre-treatment years. Also, the table shows that the absolute value of 
the normalized differences (Δx) for any of the matched criteria variables for the matched 
sample are all below the 0.25 threshold, indicating that the economic differences in the 
covariates between the two groups are not economically significant. Thus, our treatment and 
control sample are observably similar before the regulatory change in terms of the 
compliance costs and risk-taking.  
[INSERT Table 2] 
 
4.3 The effect of SACORD on compliance costs 
Table 3 presents our main results of the regression analyses. In Panels A and B, we tabulate 
the results concerning the effect of SACORD regulation on compliance costs.  In each panel, 
we present three sets of regression results that correspond to using (i) a baseline specification 
without control sample, (ii) the full sample DID model with control variables, and (iii) the 
matched sample DID model with control variables. The dependent variables, Auditfees 
(Panel A) and TAudFees (Panel B), represent the natural logarithm of the audit fees and total 
fees respectively incurred by the firm.  
In Panel A, our baseline specification without control sample (column (1)) shows a positive 
and significant coefficient on PsSACORD (β=0.17, t= 2.91), the finding suggests the increase 
of audit fees for the treatment sample following the regulation. All standard errors are 
clustered at the bank level.  In column (2), we present the baseline D-in-D OLS specification 
for audit fees based on the full sample. The key variable of interest is the interaction between 
the indicators for the EU listed banks and post-SACORD adoption period (𝐸𝑈𝑅 ∗
𝑃𝑠𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐷). The coefficient captures the effect on audit fees of firms that are affected by 
the regulation. The coefficient on EUR∗ PsSACORD is positive (β=0.19) and highly 
significant (t =3.41). The result suggests that SACORD adoption significantly increase 
treatment group audit fees by 21.2 percent relative to the control sample.
12
  
                                                          
12 Kennedy (1981) suggests the appropriate transformation to get a similar interpretation for dummy variables: 
?̂? = 100 ∗ (exp{?̂? − 0.5 ∗ ?̂?(?̂?)} − 1)  where ?̂? is the percentage change in the dependent variable given a 
change in the dummy variable from zero to one, ?̂? is the coefficient estimate for the dummy variable, and ?̂?(?̂?) 
is the OLS estimate of the variance of the coefficient. It is this transformed coefficient that is always discussed 
in the text. 
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In column (3), we estimate the effect of SACORD regulation on audit fees based on the 
matched sample. We find that coefficient on the key variable of interest remains positive and 
statistically significant at 5 percent level (β=0.16, t=2.25). The results suggest that the 
economic effect of SACORD regulation on audit fees is 17.0 percent.
13
  Taken together, these 
results indicate that independent auditors respond relatively quickly to changes in SACORD 
regulation by increasing audit fees.  
Similar to Panel A of Table 3, we examine the effect of SACORD regulation on compliance 
costs using natural logarithm of total fees (audit and non-audit fees) paid as our dependent 
variable. Panel B presents our results from estimating Eq. (1) over the full sample period. In 
column (1), our regression estimates shows a positive and statistically significant coefficient 
on PsSACORD (β=0.16, t= 2.78). The coefficient on EUR*PsSSCORD in column (2) is 
positive and statistically significant (β=0.20, t=3.45), suggesting that total fees paid by the 
EU banks to the independent auditors increased by 21.3 percent following the regulation 
relative to control sample. In column (3), the coefficient estimate of our key variable of 
interest (EUR ∗ PsSACORD) is positive and significant at the 1 percent level (β=0.20, t= 
2.85). The result suggests that the fees paid by the EU banks increased 22.3 percent post 
SACORD. The results support those in columns (1) and (2) and suggest that audit fees 
increases relative to changes in disclosure regulation.  
INSERT Table 3 (Panel A and B) 
Collectively, in terms of compliance costs, the DID specifications suggest that the average 
increase in compliance costs of EU Banks ranges from 17.0 percent to 22.3 percent of audit 
and total fees paid relative to control sample following SACORD regulation. The results in 
Table 3 provide evidence to support our prediction (P1) indicating that, relative to control 
sample, SACORD legislation has a significant positive effect on direct compliance costs for 
the EU banks. By way of comparison, De George et al. (2013) examine the effect of IFRS 
adoption in Australia and find that audit costs increased by 23 percent in the year of IFRS 
transition.  In sum, our results are economically plausible when compared to findings in the 
literature.  
                                                          
13 Calculated based on Kennedy (1981) suggestion for dummy variables: ?̂? = 100 ∗ (exp{?̂? − 0.5 ∗ ?̂?(?̂?)} − 1)  
where ?̂? is the percentage change in the dependent variable given a change in the dummy variable from zero to 
one, ?̂? is the coefficient estimate for the dummy variable, and ?̂?(?̂?) is the OLS estimate of the variance of the 
coefficient. It is this transformed coefficient that is always discussed in the text. 
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Coefficients of the control variables are generally consistent with the prior literature. For 
instance, the coefficients for Revenue, STDCFO, Asset_grwth and LLP/TA are positive and 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level or better except for STDCFO and LLP/TA 
variables of the matched sample that are not statistically significant. These results suggest 
that higher revenue, issues of financial distress, growth opportunities and higher loan loss 
provisioning is associated with increased audit fees.  
4.4 Robustness Tests 
We conduct three additional tests to assess the robustness of our results. First, the 
implementation of SACORD regulation coincides with the recent global financial crisis and 
economic recession. Consequently, to mitigate the concerns of confounding events driving 
the results, we follow Petacchi (2015) and rerun the analyses with hypothetical 
implementation years around SACORD adoption. To the extent that the increase in audit fees 
is not confounded by other contemporaneous events but by a relatively exogenous event, the 
measured effects should lead to a weaker or statically insignificant result. 
Results in Table 4 results show that rerunning the test with the supposed implementation 
years, the measured effects around SACORD were insignificant or weaker. In columns (1) 
and (2), the result for using 2006 as the supposed implementation year of SACORD (i.e., pre-
SACORD period is from 2004 to 2005 and post-SACORD period is from 2006 to 2014) 
shows that the coefficient on  TUK ∗ PsSACORD is statistically insignificant for audit fees 
(β =0.07, t=0.89) and total fees (β =0.03, t=0.40). Columns (3) and (4) presents the results 
using matched sample. In column (3), TUK ∗ PsSACORD is significant only at the 10 percent 
level for audit fees (β =0.18, t=1.84) and statistically insignificant for total fees in column 
(4). With 2007 as the hypothetical implementation year of SACORD rule, the coefficient on  
𝑇𝑈𝐾 ∗ 𝑃𝑠𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐷 is statistically insignificant in all four regressions.  
Using year 2011 as the implementation year (i.e. pre-SACORD period is from 1994 to 2010 
and post-SACORD from 2011 to 2013), the coefficient on 𝑇𝑈𝐾 ∗ 𝑃𝑠𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐷 is insignificant 
for all four regressions.
14
 Overall, our test results provide additional support that confounding 
events are not responsible for the year 2008 results. To the extent year 2008 gives the 
                                                          
14
 We use 2011 because as mentioned in session one, some countries in our sample - Austria, Czech Republic, 
Germany, Poland, Sweden adopted SACORD in 2009, while Ireland, Italy and Spain adopted SACORD in 
2010. 
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strongest result significantly strengthens our inference that SACORD legislation is the main 
driving force behind the findings.  
Second, audit fees could increase due to increase in bank assets and thus increase audit efforts 
needed to satisfy the requirements of the regulation. To ensure that this does not drive our 
results, we rerun the tests after deleting observations with increase of 10 percent in total 
assets of current year relative to the prior year, starting from the year of the implementation 
of regulatory change (94 and 130 firm-years from treatment and control sample respectively) 
because average total assets increase by about 10 percent pre-SACORD. Untabulated results 
show that our main inferences are unchanged. 
Finally, as a robustness check to address the concerns of control sample, we redefine the 
control sample, composed of listed banks in Australia and China. Untabulated results using 
control sample of listed banks in Australia and China yield results similar in tables 3. 
INSERT Table 4 
 
4.5 The effects of SACORD on bank risk-taking  
The previous section provides evidence consistent with SACORD imposing additional 
compliance costs on the EU banks.  In this section we examine SACORD’s impact on risk-
taking. Table 5 provides summary statistics of the three risk-taking variables that we have 
used in the study. The average (median) annual natural logarithm of credit rating is 1.82 
(1.79), and the average annual negative natural log of Z-score and stock return volatility of    
-3.19 and -3.30 respectively. 
INSERT Table 5 (Panel A and B) 
 
In this section, we provide empirical evidence for our second prediction (P2). In Panel A of 
Table 6, we present the full sample DID estimates of bank risk taking behaviour as measured 
by the natural logarithm of Z-Score, Stock return volatility and credit rating. The regression 
results show that all the specifications yield similar results; the coefficients of the variable of 
interest (EUR*PsSACORD) are positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level in 
columns (1) through (3). In economic terms, the adoption of SACORD regulation increases 
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bank risk-taking by approximately 11 percent (=1*0.35/3.19) relative to control sample when 
using Z-score (column (1)). Turning to column (2), we find that bank risk taking increased by 
about 34 percent (=1*0.387/1.14) relative to control sample, when using stock return 
volatility. Similarly, column (3) shows that banks’ risk-taking increased by 20 percent post-
SACORD for treatment firms relative to control firms.
15
 
INSERT Table 6 (Panel A and B) 
Similarly, Panel B of Table 6 presents the results of regressions of the three measures of bank 
risk-taking for the matched sample. The coefficients for the key variable of interest 
(EUR*PsSACORD) are positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level in column 
(1), Z-score assumes a positive and highly significant coefficient in columns (1) through (3) 
respectively. The legislation effects on audit fees are similar with that of the full sample at 10 
percent, 30 percent, and 23 percent for Z-Score, Stock return volatility and Credit Rating 
respectively. These results provide further support that EU banks’ management continue to 
take more risk after the passage of SACORD. Our findings are not surprising. Moreno and 
Takalo (2016) argue that the adverse effect arising from increasing transparency may 
motivate banks to take more risks. In sum, these results suggest that bank risk-taking 
activities increased following the passage of SACORD.   
 
4.6 The effect of SACORD on reporting quality 
We next examine the effects of SACORD on banks reporting quality. Our proxies for quality 
reporting focus on firm’s reporting behaviour and earning smoothness. Following Daske et al. 
(2013), we measure reporting behaviour (Reprt_Behvr) as the ratio of the absolute value of 
accruals to the absolute value of cash flows from operation. We measure earning smoothness 
(Smooth), as the ratio of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items 
scaled by total assets divided by the standard deviation of cash flow from operations scaled 
by total assets over the years t–4 through t (Hribar et al., 2014) with a minimum of three 
years. Due to the skewed distributions of the accounting quality measures, we use the natural 
logarithm of Reprt_Behvr and Smooth in our analysis. We multiply by (-1) so that higher 
values indicate more transparent reporting. To examine the effect of SACORD on reporting 
quality, we implement the following D-I-D regression: 
                                                          
15
 Calculated based on Kennedy (1981) suggestion 
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𝑅𝑝𝑡_𝑄𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑈𝑅 ∗ 𝑃𝑠𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐷𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                          (5) 
were Rpt_Qlty in equation (5) is our proxy for measuring bank reporting quality. 
EUR*PsSACORD is as previously defined, and Χ is a vector of control variables previously 
defined in equation (2).   
In Table 7, Panel A reports that DID regression results for reporting behaviour 
(Ln(rReport_Behvr)) as dependent variable for the full and matched samples. In Panel A, the 
coefficients of EUR*PsSAORD in columns (2) and (3) is negative and statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level (β=-0.59, β=-0.49) respectively. In economic terms, our regressions 
suggest that banks reporting quality declined by 40 to 45 percent post-SACORD.
16
 Rerunning 
equation (5) using earning smoothness (Ln(Smooth) as dependent variable. Results for the 
coefficient of the variable of interest in Panel B are statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level for columns (2) and (3) respectively.  The results thus far offer empirical evidence that 
SACORD adoption has significant effects on banks financial reporting quality. Thakor (2015) 
argues that banks may choose to disclose less information if such information disclosure will 
increase their fragility. 
INSERT Table 7 (Panel A and B) 
5. Robustness 
5.1    Alternative measure of bank size 
We test the robustness of the results by using alternative measure of bank size. We use the 
bank’s market capitalization as its measure of size. The results are consistent with those 
reported in tables where Revenue (LnRevenue) is used as the measure of bank size; these 
results are available from the authors upon request. 
5.2 Alternative measure of bank risks 
We also test the robustness of bank risk taking variables by using loan loss provision 
(LLP/TA) as a proxy for risk taking (e.g., Williams, 2004). In untabulated tests, we examine 
the effects of post-SACORD on risk taking using LLP/TA as dependent variable. The results 
                                                          
16
 Calculated based on Kennedy (1981) suggestion for dummy variables: ?̂? = 100 ∗ (exp{?̂? − 0.5 ∗ ?̂?(?̂?)} − 1)  
where ?̂? is the percentage change in the dependent variable given a change in the dummy variable from zero to 
one, ?̂? is the coefficient estimate for the dummy variable, and ?̂?(?̂?) is the OLS estimate of the variance of the 
coefficient. It is this transformed coefficient that is discussed in the text. 
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are consistent with those reported in tables where Z-score, STK_RTN_VOL and CR Rating 
are used as a measure of risk taking.  
 
6. Conclusions 
The paper examines the effects of SACORD on compliance costs and risk taking of the EU 
banks. Using data of 80 EU banks and 71 non-EU banks for the period 2004 to 2013, we 
estimate the effects of SACORD regulation compliance costs, risk taking and quality of 
reporting. Our results show that the economic effects of SACORD on audit fees are 
approximately 19 to 33 percent higher relative to the non-EU banks. We also find robust 
evidence of significant increase in in total compliance costs. The findings are consistent with 
those reported in the previous literature mainly for the US banks that regulation increases 
compliance costs.  Further, we find that post SACORD, there is a significant increase in risk-
taking and a decline in reporting quality. Findings suggest that the SACORD regulation does 
not appear to have the desired effects of constraining risk-taking by banks. 
As far as we are aware, this is the first study to investigate the impact of the new SACORD 
regulations on the EU banks. Further, there are relatively very few papers which have 
examined the impact of financial regulation on compliance costs, risk-taking and reporting 
quality. The key findings reported in the study have significant implications for policy 
makers concerned with developing financial disclosure regulation. The findings imply that 
the SACORD regulation has had a detrimental impact on banks by increasing their 
compliance costs and on the market in terms of both increased risk taking and a decline in the 
financial reporting quality by the EU banks. 
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Table 1       
Panel A: Summary statistics for treatment and control groups 
  Treatment  Control  
 Difference 
 Variable Units 
Q1 Mean Median Q3 
Std. 
Dev.  
Q1 Mean Median Q3 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Mean Median 
Auditfees €’000 542  8,961  1,783  8,800  15,796   464  5,122  1,008  3,668  11,867   3,838*** 775*** 
TAudFees €’000 699  10,829  2,342  11,213  18,464   468  5,846  1,032  4,155  13,535   4,983*** 1,310*** 
Revenue €’mill 911  13,800  3,109  14,600  22,300   158  6,876  637  3,900  17,900   6,924*** 2,473*** 
IFRS Integer 1.00 0.92 1.00 1.00 0.27  0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.30  0.82 1.00 
FinCrs Integer 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00 0.47  0.00 0.31 0.00 1.00 0.46  0.01 0.00 
Loss_Ind Integer 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.32  0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.32  0.00 0.00 
Ln(Geo_Seg) Integer 0.69 1.31 1.39 1.79 0.50  0.69 0.79 0.69 0.69 0.30  0.53 0.69 
LTDebt/TA Percent 2.03 2.54 2.73 3.28 1.17  0.91 1.69 1.83 2.47 1.16  0.85*** 0.90*** 
Nloans/TA Percent 57.29 66.45 68.29 80.34 17.49  56.29 63.82 65.50 72.17 13.10  2.63*** 2.80*** 
EcoFreedm Integer 63.00 69.33 69.60 75.30 6.87  77.80 79.10 79.90 81.00 1.90  -9.77*** -10.30*** 
Ln(RPerCapInc) Integer 10.46 10.53 10.61 10.73 0.36  10.75 10.76 10.78 10.82 0.09  -0.23*** -0.17*** 
Ln(BizDisclos_Index) Integer 1.79 1.90 2.08 2.30 0.64  2.13 1.94 2.13 2.13 0.62  -0.04 -0.05*** 
TobinQ Integer 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.96 0.07  0.89 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.04  0.02*** 0.03*** 
TA_Growth Percent -0.42 8.44 6.42 13.87 15.57  -3.14 7.22 4.09 14.40 15.73  1.22 2.33*** 
ROA Percent 0.21 0.61 0.52 0.93 2.56  0.44 0.65 0.86 1.16 1.16  -0.04*** -0.34*** 
Ln(STDCFO) Integer -5.99 -5.40 -5.53 -4.92 0.92  -6.25 -5.64 -5.78 -5.11 0.92  0.24*** 0.25*** 
NIR/Rev Percent 22.93 30.74 29.12 37.17 12.47  13.84 23.95 23.61 32.75 12.79  6.79*** 5.51*** 
Ln(Accrual/TA) Integer -5.89 -5.24 -5.12 -4.39 1.28  -5.81 -5.18 -5.24 -4.47 1.14  -0.07 0.11 
Ln(AuditCommN) Integer 0.00 1.22 1.61 1.79 0.76  1.61 1.67 1.79 1.79 0.34  -0.45*** -0.18*** 
Ln(LLP/TA) Integer -1.70 -1.14 -1.02 -0.34 1.20  -2.11 -1.36 -1.42 -0.48 1.31  0.22*** 0.41*** 
Firm-Years      735      681    
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Panel B: Primary variable descriptive statistics of the sample pre-SACORD and post-SACORD 
 OK Treatment Group  Control Group 
 Variable Units Pre- Std. Dev. Post- Std. Dev. Diff.  Pre- Std. Dev. Post- Std. Dev. Diff. 
Auditfees €’000 7,982 15,899 9,772 15,684 -1,790  4,154 8,681 5,759 13,532 -1,605* 
TAudFees €’000 9,610 17,785 11,839 18,970 -2,229*  4,900 10,249 6,468 15,295 -1,568 
Revenue €’mill 14,000 22,600 13,700 22,200 300  6,499 17,400 7,123 18,200 -624 
IFRS Integer 0.83 0.38 1.00 0.00 -0.17***  0.25 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.25*** 
FinCrs Integer 0.42 0.49 0.25 0.43 0.17  0.26 0.44 0.35 0.48 -0.08** 
Loss_Ind Integer 0.02 0.14 0.20 0.40 -0.18***  0.04 0.19 0.17 0.38 -0.14*** 
Ln(Geo_Seg) Integer 1.30 0.48 1.32 0.53 -0.02  0.79 0.30 0.79 0.30 0.00 
LTDebt/TA Percent 2.52 1.33 2.55 1.02 -0.03  1.78 1.13 1.63 1.18 0.15 
Nloans/TA Percent 67.75 16.99 65.36 17.85 2.38  64.83 12.97 63.15 13.16 1.67 
EcoFreedm Integer 69.20 7.17 69.44 6.63 -0.24  79.83 1.61 78.62 1.92 1.21*** 
Ln(RPerCapInc) Integer 10.48 0.39 10.58 0.33 -0.10***  10.70 0.09 10.81 0.05 -0.11*** 
Ln(BizDisclos_Index) Integer 1.68 0.83 2.08 0.33 -0.40***  1.65 0.90 2.14 0.02 -0.49*** 
TobinQ Integer 0.92 0.06 0.92 0.07 0.00  0.91 0.04 0.90 0.04 0.01** 
TA_Growth Percent 15.20 15.40 2.84 13.35 12.37***  9.25 18.51 5.89 13.47 3.35** 
ROA Percent 1.09 1.29 0.20 3.20 0.89***  1.04 0.59 0.39 1.36 0.65*** 
Ln(STDCFO) Integer -5.50 0.89 -5.33 0.93 -0.17  -5.66 1.00 -5.64 0.88 -0.02 
NIR/Rev Percent 30.44 13.03 30.98 12.00 -0.55  22.58 12.96 24.85 12.61 -2.27** 
Ln(Accrual/TA) Integer -5.48 1.31 -5.05 1.22 -0.44***  -5.57 0.98 -4.92 1.17 -0.65*** 
Ln(AuditCommN) Integer 1.12 0.79 1.30 0.73 -0.18  1.62 0.44 1.70 0.25 -0.09 
Ln(LLP/TA) Integer -1.61 1.24 -0.77 1.03 -0.85***  -2.05 1.08 -0.93 1.25 -1.12*** 
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Panel C: Pearson correlations for variables in main regression.              
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1.  Ln(AuditFees) 1                    
2.  EUR*PsSACORD 0.11 1.00                   
3.  IFRS 0.12 0.60 1.00                  
4.  FinCrs -0.03 -0.10 0.00 1.00                 
5.  LnGeo_Seg 0.64 0.33 0.45 -0.01 1.00                
6.  Loss_Ind 0.09 0.16 0.00 0.10 0.04 1.00               
7.  Ln(Revenue) 0.90 0.20 0.29 0.01 0.68 0.00 1.00              
8.  LTDebt/TA 0.03 0.21 0.31 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.14 1.00             
9.  Nloans/TA -0.54 0.01 0.07 0.07 -0.37 -0.01 -0.44 0.24 1.00            
10.  EcoFreedm -0.02 -0.41 -0.57 0.09 -0.28 0.04 -0.21 -0.18 -0.10 1.00           
11.  Ln(RPerCapInc) 0.00 -0.14 -0.30 0.08 -0.11 0.06 -0.13 0.02 -0.09 0.61 1.00          
12.  Ln(BizDisclos_Ind) 0.03 0.16 0.24 0.19 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.09 0.26 1.00         
13.  TobinQ 0.29 0.12 0.17 0.04 0.27 0.13 0.32 0.00 -0.07 -0.13 0.00 -0.04 1.00        
14.  Asset_grwth 0.00 -0.20 0.14 -0.03 0.04 -0.25 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.12 -0.06 -0.03 1.00       
15.  ROA -0.09 -0.13 -0.01 -0.10 -0.05 -0.44 -0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.07 -0.07 -0.61 0.16 1.00      
16.  Ln(STDCFO) 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.11 -0.07 -0.03 -0.15 0.03 -0.14 -0.05 -0.07 1.00     
17.  Ln(LLP/TA) 0.07 0.24 0.04 0.16 0.02 0.42 0.04 0.13 0.11 -0.01 -0.03 0.12 -0.06 -0.19 -0.27 0.21 1.00    
18.  NIR/Revenue 0.36 0.17 0.21 -0.16 0.25 -0.06 0.42 -0.09 -0.36 -0.30 -0.22 -0.02 0.09 0.03 0.14 0.09 0.06 1.00   
19.  Ln(AuditCommN) 0.30 -0.14 -0.29 -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.15 -0.17 -0.25 0.45 0.26 0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.03 1.00  
20.  Ln(Accrual/TA) 0.04 0.09 -0.02 0.07 -0.01 0.39 -0.01 0.09 0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.09 -0.14 -0.12 -0.19 0.31 0.55 0.02 0.02 1.00 
Panel A in Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the treatment and control groups. The difference column reports the difference in means and median 
between the treatment and control groups and is tested for significance using a two-tailed t-test and the Wilcoxon rank test respectively. The sample has 735 
treatment and 681 control group firm-year observations. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of the pre-SACORD and post-SACORD for the two sample 
groups. Test statistics are computed using a t-test (two-tailed test) for a significant change in means, statistically significance denoted as ***, **, and * for 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively, assuming independence. Panel C presents the Pearson correlations. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. Ln(Auditfees), 
Ln(LLP/TA), NIR/Rev and Asset_grwth are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
 
27 
 
 
Table 2, Panel A: Propensity score matching covariate balance test and normalized differences  
 
Full sample 
 
Matched sample 
 
EU 
Banks 
Non-EU 
Banks Diff Δx P-value 
 
EU 
Banks 
Non-EU 
Banks Diff Δx P-value 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(-4 years, 0) Ln(Revenue) 15.07 13.69 1.38 0.51 0.00*** 
 
14.72 14.71 0.01 0.00 0.979 
(-4 years, 0) Nloans/TA (%) 67.75 64.83 2.92 0.09 0.12 
 
64.84 64.87 -0.03 0.00 0.990 
(-4 years, 0) ROA (%) 1.09 1.04 0.05 0.11 0.07* 
 
1.05 1.15 -0.10 0.10 0.270 
(-4 years, 0) Ln(STDCFO) -5.50 -5.66 0.16 0.12 0.06* 
 
-5.50 -5.63 0.13 0.11 0.223 
(-4 years, 0) Asset_grwth (%) 15.20 9.25 5.95 0.33 0.00*** 14.09 15.81 -1.73 0.08 0.406 
(-4 years, 0) LTDebt/TA (%) 2.44 1.78 0.66 0.36 0.000***  2.13 1.98 0.15 0.08 0.384 
Firm-year  544      242    
This table provides mean values of the matching variables for the treatment and control samples for the pre-treatment period (2004-
2007). In total, we identified 121 firm-year matches (242 pairs) using one-to-one nearest neighbour matching by year approach with a 
0.01 caliper and without replacement. Following Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), normalized differences (Δx) are also reported and used 
to assess the economic signiﬁcance of the reported differences. The normalized difference (Δx) is calculated as 
𝑿𝑬𝑼− 𝑿𝑵𝑬𝑼
√𝑺𝑬𝑼
𝟐 +𝑺𝑵𝑬𝑼
𝟐
  where  𝑋 and 
𝑆2 are the sample mean and variance. The matched sample normalized differences are below the recommended threshold of 0.25 
(Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). Matched sample analysis is based on Fiscal Year, size (Ln(Revenue), profitability (ROA), financial 
distress (LTDebt/TA, Ln(STDCFO)), growth opportunities (Asset_grwth) and business risk (Nloans/TA). All variables are as defined in 
Appendix A. Asset_grwth is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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Table 2, Panel B: Propensity score matching covariate balance test and normalized differences  
 
Full sample 
 
Matched sample 
 
EU 
Banks 
Non-EU 
Banks Diff Δx P-value 
 
EU 
Banks 
Non-EU 
Banks Diff Δx P-value 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(0, +6 years) Ln(Revenue) 15.08 13.71 1.37 0.52 0.000  14.78 14.83 -0.05 0.02 0.804 
(0, +6 years) Nloans/TA (%) 66.17 63.15 3.02 0.14 0.004  63.40 63.69 -0.29 -0.01 0.862 
(0, +6 years) ROA (%) 0.25 0.39 -0.14 0.04 0.366  -0.05 0.373 -0.423 0.10 0.175 
(0, +6 years) Ln(STDCFO) -5.35 -5.64 0.29 0.23 0.000  -5.44 -5.44 0.00 0.00 0.974 
(0, +6 years Asset_grwth (%) 3.21 5.89 -2.68 0.14 0.002  3.35 4.70 1.35 0.07 0.327 
(0, +6 years) LTDebt/TA (%) 2.60 1.63 0.97 0.63 0.000  2.18 2.18 0.00 0.00 0.983 
Firm-year  872      384    
This table provides mean values of the matching variables for the treatment and control samples for the pre-treatment period (2008-
2013). In total, we identified 192 firm-year matches (384 pairs) using one-to-one nearest neighbour matching by year approach with a 
0.01 caliper and without replacement. Following Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), normalized differences (Δx) are also reported and used 
to assess the economic signiﬁcance of the reported differences. The normalized difference (Δx) is calculated as 
𝑿𝑬𝑼− 𝑿𝑵𝑬𝑼
√𝑺𝑬𝑼
𝟐 +𝑺𝑵𝑬𝑼
𝟐
  where  𝑋 and 
𝑆2 are the sample mean and variance. The matched sample normalized differences are below the recommended threshold of 0.25 
(Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). Matched sample analysis is based on Fiscal Year, size (Ln(Revenue), profitability (ROA), financial 
distress (LTDebt/TA, Ln(STDCFO)), growth opportunities (Asset_grwth) and business risk (Nloans/TA). All variables are as defined in 
Appendix A. Asset_grwth is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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Table 3 (Panel A) 
Multivariate analysis of audit fee differences between EU banks and control sample 
 This table presents SACORD effect on audit fees and total fees. The dependent variables are the Natural 
logarithm of Audit Fees. In estimating (1) to (4), EUR*PsSACORD is an interaction dummy variable equals to 
one if the bank is EU and the period is from 2008/adoption year to 2013. We include year and firm fixed effects 
to control for any fundamental differences in audit fees across years and firms. Implied audit fee increase refers 
to the effect of implementing SACORD regulation on mean banks in EU in € thousands. Matched sample 
analysis is based on Fiscal Year, size (Ln(Revenue), profitability (ROA), financial distress 
(Ln(STDCFO), LTDebt/TA), growth opportunities (Asset_grwth) and business risk (Nloans/TA). All 
other firm characteristics are as defined in Appendix A. The models are estimated by difference-in-differences 
with standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Statistically significance 
denoted as ***, **, and * for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (using a two-sided test). Ln(Auditfees), 
Ln(LLP/TA), NIR/Revenue and Asset_grwth are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
 Full Sample  Matched Sample 
 Ln(Auditfees)  Ln(Auditfees)  Ln(Auditfees)  Ln(Auditfees) 
 No Controls  With controls  No Controls  With controls 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  
 Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value 
EUR*PsSACORD 0.283*** 5.29  0.193*** 3.41  0.323*** 4.35  0.160** 2.25 
IFRS    0.049 1.11     -0.021 -0.34 
FinCrs    -0.064** -2.37     -0.080** -2.02 
LnGeo_Seg    0.137 1.54     0.078 0.24 
Loss_Ind    0.015 0.31     0.041 0.46 
Ln(Revenue)    0.476*** 7.18     0.543*** 7.99 
LTDebt/TA    0.016 0.89     -0.002 -0.09 
Nloans/TA    -0.002 -0.97     -0.002 -0.53 
EcoFreedm    -0.022** -2.16     -0.017 -1.28 
Ln(RPerCapInc)    1.041*** 6.41     0.931*** 4.64 
Ln(BizDisclos_Ind)    -0.042 -1.52     0.016 0.50 
TobinQ    0.328 0.39     0.531 0.34 
Asset_grwth    0.001 1.16     0.000 0.45 
ROA    -0.028 -1.50     -0.050 -1.43 
Ln(STDCFO)    0.058*** 3.13     0.030 0.96 
Ln(LLP/TA)    0.033*** 2.71     0.004 0.22 
NIR/Revenue    0.001 0.66     0.005 1.45 
Ln(AuditCommN)    -0.037 -0.89     -0.108** -2.49 
Ln(Accrual/TA)    -0.014 -1.12     0.004 0.22 
Intercept 7.424*** 489.02  -8.668*** -4.05  7.658*** 372.64  -9.111*** -3.09 
Impact (%) 32.54   21.15   37.80   17.03  
Number of observations 1416   1164   626   541  
R-squared 0.01   0.78   0.001   0.80  
Firm fixed effects YES 
  
YES  
 
YES  
 
YES  
Year fixed effects YES 
  
YES  
 
YES  
 
YES  
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Table 3 (Panel B) 
Multivariate analyss of Total fees differences between EU banks and control group 
 This table presents SACORD effect on audit fees and total fees. The dependent variables are the Natural 
logarithm of Total Fees. In estimating (1) to (4), EUR*PsSACORD is an interaction dummy variable equals to 
one if the bank is EU and the period is from 2008/adoption year to 2013. We include year and firm fixed effects 
to control for any fundamental differences in audit fees across years and firms. Implied audit fee increase refers 
to the effect of implementing SACORD regulation on mean banks in EU in € thousands. Matched sample 
analysis is based on Fiscal Year, size (Ln(Revenue), profitability (ROA), financial distress 
(Ln(STDCFO), LTDebt/TA), growth opportunities (Asset_grwth) and business risk (Nloans/TA). All 
other firm characteristics are as defined in Appendix A. The models are estimated by difference-in-differences 
with standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Statistically significance 
denoted as ***, **, and * for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (using a two-sided test). Ln(Auditfees), 
Ln(LLP/TA), NIR/Rev and Asset_grwth are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
 Full Sample  Matched Sample 
 Ln(TotalFees)  Ln(TotalFees)  Ln(TotalFees)  Ln(TotalFees) 
 No Controls  With controls  No Controls  With controls 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  
 Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value 
EUR*PsSACORD 0.261*** 4.41  0.195*** 3.45  0.329*** 4.28  0.204*** 2.85 
IFRS    0.051 1.11     -0.028 -0.46 
FinCrs    -0.070** -2.41     -0.093** -2.16 
LnGeo_Seg    0.141 1.42     0.166 0.52 
Loss_Ind    -0.003 -0.05     0.038 0.39 
Ln(Revenue)    0.507*** 7.91     0.543*** 7.53 
LTDebt/TA    0.007 0.42     -0.005 -0.19 
Nloans/TA    -0.003 -1.19     -0.001 -0.27 
EcoFreedm    -0.021** -2.11     -0.014 -1.07 
Ln(RPerCapInc)    1.145*** 6.68     1.004*** 4.64 
Ln(BizDisclos_Ind)    -0.073*** -2.65     -0.048 -1.32 
TobinQ    0.387 0.43     0.493 0.32 
Asset_grwth    0.001 1.57     0.001 1.27 
ROA    -0.024 -1.30     -0.045 -1.22 
Ln(STDCFO)    0.049** 2.51     0.012 0.35 
Ln(LLP/TA)    0.033*** 2.71     0.011 0.59 
NIR/Revenue    0.001 0.41     0.002 0.68 
Ln(AuditCommN)    -0.063 -1.53     -0.129*** -2.73 
Ln(Accrual/TA)    -0.004 -0.32     0.006 0.31 
Intercept 7.564**** 449.69  -10.109*** -4.52  7.785*** 366.28  -9.919*** -3.09 
Impact (%) 29.66   21.28   38.52   22.33  
Number of observations 1416   1164   626   541  
R-squared 0.02   0.80   0.001   0.82  
Firm fixed effects YES 
  
YES  
 
YES  
 
YES  
Year fixed effects YES 
  
YES  
 
YES  
 
YES  
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Table 4 Full Sample  Matched Sample 
 
Ln(Auditfees
) Ln(Totalfees)  Ln(Auditfees) Ln(Totalfees) 
EUR*PsSACORD[2006] 0.074 0.031  0.182* 0.097 
 [0.89] [0.40]  [1.84] [0.78] 
EUR*PsSACORD[2007] 0.029 0.035  -0.034 0.070 
 [0.39] [0.46]  [-0.33] [0.58] 
EUR*PsSACORD[2008] 0.253*** 0.272***  0.171** 0.188** 
 [4.26] [4.17]  [2.25] [2.18] 
EUR*PsSACORD[2011] -0.014 0.001  -0.071* -0.036 
 [-0.45] [0.02]  [-1.88] [-0.82] 
EUR*PsSACORD[2012] -0.012 -0.024  0.014 -0.012 
 [-0.32] [-0.61]  [0.26] [-0.21] 
Observation 1164 1164  541 541 
R-squared 0.77 0.81  0.80 0.83 
Controls YES YES  YES YES 
Firm fixed effects YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES 
 
YES YES 
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Table 5 (Panel A) 
Descriptive statistics for full sample 
 
 This table presents the distribution of variables by showing mean, median (Median) 
standard deviation (SD), minimum (Min.), and maximum (Max). The sample consists of 
publicly listed banks in DataStream from 2004 to 2013 for treatment and control firms. All 
variables in the regressions are defined in the Appendix A. 
variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ln(STK_RTN_Vol) 1402 -1.14 -1.20 0.55 -2.32 0.41 
Ln(Z-score) 1382 -3.19 -3.30 0.90 -5.41 3.55 
Ln(Credit Rating) 1056 1.82 1.79 0.42 0.69 3.00 
Ln(LLP/TA) 1305 -1.24 -1.24 1.26 -5.06 1.51 
Ln(NPL/TA) 1230 -0.18 -0.10 1.54 -10.41 2.63 
EUR*PsSACORD 1416 0.28 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 
IFRS 1416 0.53 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
FinCrs 1416 0.32 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Ln(Geo_Seg) 1416 1.06 0.69 0.50 0.69 2.40 
Loss_Ind 1416 0.12 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Ln(Revenue) 1416 14.41 14.20 2.01 10.95 18.53 
Ln(LTDebt/TA) 1392 2.13 2.32 1.24 -7.33 4.54 
Nloans/TA (%) 1395 65.16 66.65 15.56 2.82 97.82 
EcoFreedm 1416 74.03 76.50 7.08 55.40 82.60 
Ln(RPerCapInc) 1416 10.64 10.73 0.29 8.80 11.07 
Ln(BizDisclos_Ind) 1416 1.92 2.13 0.63 0.00 2.40 
TobinQ 1405 0.91 0.92 0.06 0.45 1.77 
Ln(AuditCommN) 1331 1.45 1.61 0.62 0.00 2.48 
CFO/TA (%) 1416 1.41 1.32 1.20 -2.38 7.82 
Asset_grwth 1415 7.85 5.55 15.66 -21.76 75.82 
Ln(STDCFO) 1399 -5.52 -5.63 0.93 -8.15 -1.58 
DEPOSIT/TA (%) 1350 57.62 59.22 19.18 0.93 91.39 
Inst_Investor 1416 0.40 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
ROA (%) 1416 0.63 0.71 2.01 -47.79 12.74 
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Table 5 (Panel B) 
Descriptive statistics for matched sample 
 
 This table presents the distribution of variables by showing mean, median (Median) 
standard deviation (SD), minimum (Min.), and maximum (Max). The sample consists of 
publicly listed banks in DataStream from 2004 to 2013 for treatment and control firms. All 
variables in the regressions are defined in the Appendix A. 
variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ln(STK_RTN_Vol) 620 -1.15 -1.25 0.58 -2.32 0.41 
Ln(Z-score) 610 -3.20 -3.33 0.90 -5.11 0.90 
Ln(Credit Rating) 515 1.81 1.79 0.41 0.69 3.00 
Ln(LLP/TA) 597 -1.21 -1.21 1.25 -5.06 1.51 
Ln(NPL/TA) 566 -0.13 -0.05 1.48 -5.76 2.63 
EUR*PsSACORD 626 0.28 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 
IFRS 626 0.53 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
FinCrs 626 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Ln(Geo_Seg) 626 1.05 0.69 0.50 0.69 2.40 
Loss_Ind 626 0.12 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Ln(Revenue) 626 14.77 14.60 1.93 11.20 18.53 
Ln(LTDebt/TA) 626 2.13 2.28 1.13 -6.23 4.54 
Nloans/TA (%) 626 64.05 65.60 16.31 13.59 97.82 
EcoFreedm 626 73.96 76.95 7.26 55.40 82.20 
Ln(RPerCapInc) 626 10.64 10.74 0.33 8.80 11.07 
Ln(BizDisclos_Ind) 626 1.93 2.13 0.62 0.00 2.40 
TobinQ 622 0.92 0.92 0.05 0.59 1.77 
Ln(AuditCommN) 584 1.44 1.61 0.65 0.00 2.48 
CFO/TA (%) 626 1.42 1.37 1.02 -2.38 7.82 
Asset_grwth 626 8.25 6.25 15.52 -21.76 75.82 
Ln(STDCFO) 626 -5.49 -5.58 0.85 -7.56 -1.58 
DEPOSIT/TA (%) 609 56.86 59.53 17.32 5.65 89.18 
Inst_Investor 626 0.37 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
ROA (%) 626 0.52 0.72 2.49 -47.79 7.36 
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Table 6 (Panel A: Full sample)  
The SACORD regulation and banks’ risk taking with full sample 
 
 This table shows the regression results for the risk taking behaviour of banks post-SACORD. The dependent variables 
are the natural log value of bank Z-score computed as bank’s return on assets plus the capital asset ratio divided by the 
standard deviation of daily stock return from Pathan (2009) and multiplied by (-1) to make a larger Z-score reflects a 
higher risk taking; stock return volatility computed as the natural log value of the standard deviation of daily stock 
returns for each firm-year; and credit rating calculated as the natural log value of the average numerical value of 
Standard & Poor (S&P), Moody and Fitch (Long Term Issuer) credit ratings. Z-score coefficients is standardized, i.e., 
the coefficient displays how many standard deviations the dependent variable changes for a one-standard deviation 
change in the independent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** denote significance at 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. All other firm characteristics are as defined in Appendix A. Ln(LLP/TA) and 
Asset_grwth are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Ln(Z-Score)  Ln(Stock Return Vol.)  Ln(Credit Rating) 
 Coefficient t-value  Coefficient t-value  Coefficient t-value 
EUR*PsSACORD 0.352*** 5.92  0.387*** 8.02  0.182*** 5.44 
IFRS -0.150*** -3.25  -0.094*** -2.78  -0.041 -1.54 
FinCrs 0.587*** 19.23  0.537*** 23.08  -0.096*** -5.26 
LnGeo_Seg -0.186* -1.68  -0.091 -1.57  -0.011 -0.21 
Loss_Ind 0.715*** 9.04  0.193*** 4.00  0.091*** 2.81 
Ln(Revenue) -0.164* -1.91  -0.127** -2.11  -0.055 -0.92 
LTDebt/TA 0.019 0.80  0.028 1.44  0.000 0.02 
Nloans/TA -0.010*** -4.22  -0.006*** -3.15  -0.004** -2.05 
EcoFreedm 0.013 1.43  -0.001 -0.14  -0.028*** -4.00 
Ln(RPerCapInc) -0.010 -0.06  -0.031 -0.20  -0.099 -0.86 
Ln(BizDisclos_Ind) 0.127*** 4.00  0.101*** 4.21  0.067*** 4.43 
TobinQ 10.654*** 6.36  0.809 1.31  -0.675 -1.10 
Ln(AuditCommN) -0.070* -1.80  -0.085** -2.40  0.068*** 3.15 
CFO/TA -0.011 -0.60  0.008 0.53  -0.006 -0.59 
Asset_grwth 0.002* 1.80  0.001* 1.89  -0.002*** -3.52 
Ln(LLP/TA) 0.195*** 9.23  0.145*** 9.21  0.018* 1.93 
Ln(STDCFO) 0.055*** 2.71  0.034** 2.10  0.017 1.09 
Deposit/TA -0.001 -0.43  0.000 0.03  0.007*** 3.21 
Inst_Investor 0.087** 2.04  0.043 1.42  -0.014 -0.63 
ROA    -0.066*** -3.33  -0.048*** -4.70 
Intercept -10.416*** -3.91  0.902 0.49  6.190*** 4.65 
Number of observations 1140   1155   893  
R-squared 0.52   0.53   0.29  
Impact (%) 11.0   33.9   20.0  
Firm fixed effects YES   YES   YES  
Year fixed effects YES   YES   YES  
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Table 6 (Panel B: Matched sample analysis is based on Fiscal Year, size (Ln(Revenue), profitability (ROA), 
financial distress (Ln(STDCFO)), growth opportunities (Asset_grwth) and business risk (Nloans/TA).  
 
The SACORD regulation and banks’ risk taking with control sample 
 
 This table shows the regression results for the risk taking behaviour of banks post-SACORD. The dependent 
variables are the natural log value of bank Z-score computed as bank’s return on assets plus the capital asset 
ratio divided by the standard deviation of daily stock return from Pathan (2009) and multiplied by (-1) to make 
a larger Z-score reflects a higher risk taking; stock return volatility computed as the natural log value of the 
standard deviation of daily stock returns for each firm-year; and credit rating calculated as the natural log value 
of the average numerical value of Standard & Poor (S&P), Moody and Fitch (Long Term Issuer) credit ratings. 
Z-score coefficients is standardized, i.e., the coefficient displays how many standard deviations the dependent 
variable changes for a one-standard deviation change in the independent variable. Standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. All other firm characteristics 
are as defined in Appendix A. Ln(LLP/TA) and Asset_grwth are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Ln(Z-Score)  Ln(Stock Return Vol.)  Ln(Credit Rating) 
 Coef. t-value  Coef. t-value  Coef. t-value 
EUR*PsSACORD 0.325*** 3.49  0.343*** 4.59  0.207*** 4.40 
IFRS -0.274*** -3.77  -0.153*** -2.83  -0.063* -1.90 
FinCrs 0.628*** 11.03  0.562*** 12.34  -0.088*** -3.06 
LnGeo_Seg 0.07 0.20  0.198 0.60  0.037 0.32 
Loss_Ind 0.743*** 6.06  0.151* 1.75  0.075** 2.16 
Ln(Revenue) -0.228** -2.00  -0.184** -2.14  -0.095 -1.22 
LTDebt/TA 0.005 0.11  0.017 0.48  -0.016 -0.84 
Nloans/TA -0.014*** -3.57  -0.008*** -2.80  -0.002 -1.20 
EcoFreedm -0.003 -0.19  -0.014 -1.20  -0.042*** -4.59 
Ln(RPerCapInc) -0.262 -0.93  -0.081 -0.37  0.003 0.02 
Ln(BizDisclos_Ind) 0.209*** 4.51  0.13*** 3.71  0.06** 2.59 
TobinQ 9.853*** 5.79  -0.012 -0.01  -1.242 -1.36 
Ln(AuditCommN) -0.059 -0.91  -0.102** -2.01  0.075*** 3.26 
CFO/TA 0.001 0.02  0.043** 2.12  -0.005 -0.46 
Asset_grwth 0.003* 1.79  0.001 1.24  -0.002*** -2.97 
Ln(LLP/TA) 0.21*** 6.20  0.147*** 5.52  0.012 1.11 
Ln(STDCFO) 0.05 1.25  0.043 1.38  0.015 0.75 
Deposit/TA -0.004 -0.71  -0.004 -0.90  0.002 0.86 
Inst_Investor 0.079 0.94  0.02 0.38  -0.047 -1.46 
ROA    -0.133*** -3.37  -0.045*** -2.90 
Intercept -4.799* -1.73  4.124** 2.01  7.437*** 4.56 
Number of observations 530   536   460  
R-squared (%) 0.58   0.48   0.16  
Impact (%) 10.2   30.1   23.0  
Firm fixed effects YES   YES   YES  
Year fixed effects YES   YES   YES  
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Table 7 (Panel A) 
The effect of SACORD on reporting quality 
 This table presents regression analysis of changes in actual reporting behaviour associated with SACORD regulation. The 
dependent variable is measured as the absolute value of accruals scaled by the absolute value of cash flows from operations 
(multiplied by –1 so that higher values indicate more transparent reporting) from Daske et al. (2013). Earning smoothness 
(Smooth) is measured as the natural logarithm of the of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items 
(scaled by total assets) divided by the standard deviation of cash flow from operations (scaled by total assets) over the years t 
– 4 through t from Hribar et al., (2014).  We include year and firm fixed effects; standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. All other firm characteristics are as defined in Appendix A. 
 Ln(Report_Behvr) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 No Control Sample  Full Sample  Matched Sample 
 Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value 
PsSACORD -0.590*** -5.05       
EUR*PsSACORD    -0.587*** -5.90  -0.491*** -3.95 
IFRS 0.549 1.07  0.240** 2.23  0.419*** 2.92 
FinCrs -0.110 -1.17  -0.113 -1.62  0.126 1.24 
LnGeo_Seg 0.291* 1.94  0.236 1.61  0.029 0.09 
Loss_Ind -0.325** -2.27  -0.362*** -3.44  -0.211 -1.32 
Ln(Revenue) 0.157 0.91  0.086 0.67  0.085 0.43 
LTDebt/TA -0.065 -1.00  -0.074* -1.78  -0.144** -2.08 
Nloans/TA 0.005 0.72  0.011** 2.45  0.009 1.53 
EcoFreedm -0.042 -1.44  0.002 0.09  -0.031 -1.02 
Ln(RPerCapInc) 1.222** 2.24  0.587 1.61  0.513 1.22 
Ln(BizDisclos_Ind) -0.471* -1.87  -0.213*** -3.16  -0.216** -2.11 
TobinQ 0.408 0.08  1.453 0.94  3.321 1.26 
Ln(AuditCommN) -0.039 -0.50  -0.109 -1.33  -0.165 -1.37 
Asset_grwth -0.002 -0.59  -0.004** -2.01  -0.004 -1.13 
Deposit/TA -0.016*** -2.96  -0.01* -1.97  -0.004 -0.59 
Inst_Investor 0.228 1.66  0.04 0.58  0.116 1.18 
ROA 0.310*** 3.47  0.34*** 6.44  0.456*** 6.54 
Intercept -15.849** -2.45  -12.469*** -3.01  -11.027** -2.12 
Number of observations 584   1244   567  
R-squared (%) 0.09   0.23   0.22  
Impact (%)    -44.7   -39.7  
Firm fixed effects YES   YES   YES  
Year fixed effects YES   YES   YES  
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Table 7 (Panel B) 
The effect of SACORD on reporting quality 
 This table presents regression analysis of changes in actual reporting behaviour associated with SACORD regulation. The 
dependent variable is measured as the absolute value of accruals scaled by the absolute value of cash flows from 
operations (multiplied by –1 so that higher values indicate more transparent reporting) from Daske et al. (2013). Earning 
smoothness (Smooth) is measured as the natural logarithm of the of the standard deviation of net income before 
extraordinary items (scaled by total assets) divided by the standard deviation of cash flow from operations (scaled by total 
assets) over the years t – 4 through t from Hribar et al., (2014). We include year and firm fixed effects; standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. All other firm characteristics 
are as defined in Appendix A. 
 Ln(Smooth) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 No Control Sample  Full Sample  Matched Sample 
 Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value 
PsSACORD -0.152 -1.55       
EUR*PsSACORD    -0.174* -1.69  -0.271* -1.71 
IFRS 0.725 0.88  0.417*** 3.60  0.299* 1.74 
FinCrs -0.039 -0.50  -0.113** -2.20  -0.155 -1.66 
LnGeo_Seg -0.500 -0.72  -0.44 -0.64  -0.59 -0.73 
Loss_Ind -0.258** -2.44  -0.264*** -2.75  -0.219* -1.71 
Ln(Revenue) -0.024 -0.12  0.254 1.57  0.27 1.20 
LTDebt/TA -0.072 -1.30  -0.073 -1.49  -0.082* -1.71 
Nloans/TA -0.003 -0.29  0.003 0.55  -0.007 -0.85 
EcoFreedm -0.034 -1.44  0.037 1.57  0.067** 2.06 
Ln(RPerCapInc) 0.531 0.82  -0.194 -0.41  -0.335 -0.50 
Ln(BizDisclos_Ind) -0.362 -0.84  -0.197*** -2.69  -0.132 -1.02 
TobinQ -6.449* -1.70  0.483 0.26  -0.308 -0.10 
Ln(AuditCommN) -0.042 -0.38  -0.056 -0.55  -0.049 -0.35 
Asset_grwth 0.000 -0.22  -0.001 -0.93  -0.001 -0.68 
Deposit/TA -0.025*** -2.90  -0.019*** -2.82  -0.015* -1.75 
Inst_Investor -0.146 -1.10  -0.081 -0.84  -0.035 -0.25 
ROA 0.181*** 4.17  0.183*** 4.90  0.236*** 4.10 
Intercept 5.959 0.94  -2.652 -0.52  -2.487 -0.33 
Number of observations 576   1233   567  
R-squared (%) 0.02   0.17   0.07  
Impact (%)    -16.5   -24.7  
Firm fixed effects YES   YES   YES  
Year fixed effects YES   YES   YES  
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Appendix A. Variable definitions 
Variables Description 
AuditCommN Natural logarithm of 1 plus the size of the audit committee. Data for this 
variable come from BoardEx. 
Accru/TA The natural logarithm of the ratio of the absolute value of accruals 
(difference between net income before extraordinary items and cash 
flow from operations) scaled by ending total assets (Leuz et al., 2003) 
Asset_grwth The rate of growth in total assets between the current year and the prior 
year. 
Auditfees Natural logarithm of total audit and audit-related fees charged by the 
external auditor for audit related work winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 
percentiles. 
BizDisclos_Ind Natural log of Business extent of disclosure index from World 
Development Indicators. 
Capital/TA Natural logarithm of equity capital scaled by total assets. 
CFO/TA Cash flow from operations scaled by total assets 
CR_Rating Average numerical value of Standard & Poor (S&P), Moody and Fitch 
(Long Term Issuer) credit ratings as a proxy for bank risk taking 
construed by Iannotta et al., 2013. 
Deposit/TA Total bank deposits scaled by total assets. 
EconFreedm Economic freedom index from the Heritage Foundation (EconFreedm)   
FinCrs Financial crisis dummy equals 1 between 2007-2009. 
Geo_seg Natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of geographical segments from 
Datastream. 
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards dummy equals 1 when IFRS 
was implemented in EU in 2005-2013 and 2011-2013 in Canada. 
Inst_Investor Dummy variable equal 1 if institutional shareholding is greater than 5 
percent 
LLP/TA Natural logarithm of loan loss provision scaled by total assets. 
Loss_Ind Dummy variable equal 1 if the bank reported a loss in the current year. 
LTDebt/TA  Leverage ratio, measured as natural logarithm of long term debts scaled 
by total assets. 
NIR/Revenue Non-interest-revenue scaled by total revenue winsorized at the 1
st
 and 
99
th
 percentiles. 
Nloan/TA Net loans scaled by Total assets. 
Reporting  
Behaviour 
The natural logarithm of the ratio of the absolute value of accruals scaled 
by the absolute value of cash flows (multiplied by –1 so that higher 
values indicate more transparent reporting) and winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. Accruals is the difference between net income before 
extraordinary items and the cash flow from operations (from Daske et 
al., 2013, Hope et al., 2013).  
Revenue Natural logarithm of net revenue of the financial year.  
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ROA Return on assets. Net income divided by total assets. 
RPerCapInc Natural logarithm of real per capital income.  Source: World 
Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank and Eurostat. 
Smooth Earning smoothness is measured as the natural logarithm of the of the 
standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items (scaled by 
total assets) divided by the standard deviation of cash flow from 
operations (scaled by total assets) over the years t – 4 through t (Francis 
et al. 2004; Hribar et al., 2014). We (multiplied by –1 so that higher 
values indicate more transparent reporting). 
STDCFO Natural logarithm of the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations scaled by total assets where the standard deviation is 
calculated using the prior years t-4 to t with a minimum of three years.  
STK_RTN_VOL Natural logarithm of the standard deviation of daily stock returns 
measured over one year. 
TA Natural logarithm of total assets of firm. 
TobinQ Tobin’ q is measured as the market value (MV) of equity less the book 
value (BV) of equity, plus the book value of assets, all scaled by the 
book value of assets ( (MV of equity − BV of equity + BV of assets)/BV 
of assets) (Mclean and Zhao, 2014). 
TtlAudFees Natural logarithm of total audit fees, audit related fees and non-audit 
fees paid to the auditors winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. 
Z-score It is measured as the natural logarithm of return-on-assets and the ratio 
of equity over total assets divided by the standard deviation  of daily 
stock market returns over one year ((Net income / Assets (book value) + 
Capital / Assets (book values))/ (Standard deviation of daily market 
returns over one year). 
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